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In the 40 years since the discovery of the
Ebola virus, there have been 24 outbreaks,
none of which has ever infected more
than 450 people at a time (1). The 2014 to
2016 epidemic, which spread quickly across
West Africa, infected more than 28,000
people and killed at least 11,000, quickly
eclipsing all previous outbreaks combined.
What was initially believed to be an isolated
outbreak in Guinea crossed international
borders for the first time, sparking
outbreaks in neighboring Sierra Leone
and Liberia and even in noncontiguous
countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, and
Mali. Sporadic cases among travelers
returning from the region to North
America or Europe elicited tremendous
fear and exposed significant underlying
susceptibilities within the North American
and European infection control systems (1).
Ebola has put the world on notice that
rapid globalization has connected
communities in such a way that emerging
infectious diseases, once categorized as
“tropical” in nature, are now worldwide
threats that require urgent global responses.
Included among the 28,639 people
infected in the most recent epidemic were
881 health care workers, 551 of whom died.
The loss depleted an already precious
resource, as Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra
Leone were already among the countries
with the lowest number of health care
workers per capita (1 for every 1,597 people
in Guinea, 3,472 people in Liberia, and 5,319
people in Sierra Leone) (2, 3). Decades
of civil conflict and extreme poverty
decimated the health care and sanitation
infrastructures of those countries, creating a
flammable milieu ripe for nosocomial
transmission of Ebola to health care
workers. The lack of readily available
laboratories capable of performing
validated Ebola diagnostics complicated
two critical aspects of administrative
infection control: patient triage and
isolation. Additionally, unreliable supply
chains of basic necessities such as chlorine,
gloves, gowns, face masks, and training
in standard precautions and infection
control further impaired the ability of
health care workers to safely care for an
infected patient. In effect, the lack of
adequate infection control not only put
health care workers at risk but also made it
difficult to provide the necessary care.
Given that 3 billion people travel by air
each year, it was inevitable that an infected
passenger would spark an outbreak in an
unsuspecting country, as occurred in
Nigeria, Spain, and the United States (4).
In September 2014, the infection of two
health care workers in Dallas caring for
an Ebola-infected patient who had
recently traveled from Liberia exposed
susceptibilities in the infection-control
system of hospitals in the United States.
In response to this cluster and the growing
epidemic in West Africa, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention galvanized
a national effort to identify a select number
of facilities in each state with augmented
capacity to safely provide comprehensive
care to a patient infected with Ebola or
another high-consequence pathogen (5).
The article by Garibaldi and colleagues
(pp. 600–608) in this issue of AnnalsATS
describes the construction and implementation
of one such biocontainment unit at the Johns
Hopkins Medical Center in Baltimore (6).
Although thus far it has only been used to
rule out persons under investigation, the
Hopkins unit appears to have achieved a
critical balance between health care provider
safety and the ability to provide effective
patient care.
On the basis of consensus
recommendations and visits to three of
the four preexisting U.S. biocontainment
units (6), the Johns Hopkins facility,
with three patient rooms and a four-patient
capacity, is located away from other clinical
areas to preserve normal patient flow and
prevent nosocomial transmission. The
layout, aided by separate donning
and doffing rooms and visual cues at
each door, ensures unidirectional flow
of staff and materials to reduce cross-
contamination. Air-handling systems
were implemented to allow for the care
of infections that are spread by contact,
droplet, and airborne routes. There is a
graded pressure system from outside to
inside the biocontainment unit that ensures
air flow proceeds from outside the unit into
the main corridor, from the corridor into
the donning and doffing rooms, and then
into the patient rooms, in which airflow
exceeds the requirement of 12 air changes
per hour for all rooms.
A significant obstacle in the care of a
patient infected with a high-consequence
pathogen is the handling of Category A
medical waste. In patients with Ebola
virus disease, the volume of diarrhea can
exceed 10 L in a single day (7). Although
there are limited data on the use of
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autoclaves for decontamination of patient-
related waste, the Johns Hopkins team
validated one approach using biological
indicators embedded within mock patient
trash loads. The publication of these
methods will be important in advancing
the management of highly infectious waste.
Additionally, to facilitate cleaning of rooms,
the walls and floors in patient care areas
were heat-welded and seamless. These
environmental infection control details are
crucial for decreasing pathogen burden in
health care areas and thus mitigating health
care worker exposure and infection.
A well-designed and safe
biocontainment unit does more than
protect health care workers—it also
provides a safe space that allows staff
members to provide uncompromised
patient care. A number of features in the
Johns Hopkins unit transcend infection
control and allow for a higher level of
care. The use of a sophisticated digital
stethoscope permits cardiac, pulmonic,
and abdominal auscultation while wearing
a powered air-purifying respirator—
something that most providers were
unable to do in West Africa or in other
biocontainment units in the United States.
An on-site laboratory allows for rapid
blood chemistry, hematology, and blood
gas testing.
In more cases than not, individuals
returning from West Africa with suspected
Ebola have an alternative cause for their
illness. So that the fear of Ebola does not
delay the provision of appropriate care, the
Johns Hopkins biocontainment unit is
supported by advanced diagnostic
resources, including polymerase chain
reaction testing for respiratory and blood
pathogens, to evaluate patients for more
common diseases while also ruling out
Ebola.
The Johns Hopkins biocontainment
unit models an innovative approach that
builds off of the foundation of experience
from preexisting units in the United States.
However, there are very few data to
support this or any other approach. The
lack of evidence-based guidelines in
infection control for high-consequence
pathogens is itself a global weakness. It is
critical that hospital-based biocontainment
units, such as the one constructed by
Johns Hopkins and others, when not
occupied by a patient, be used to generate
data on effective infection control practices
and inform the safe and effective care of
patients with high-consequence pathogens.
The authors pledge to do just that and
plan, in a collaboration with Clinical
and Facilities Engineering, to examine
the efficacy of air-handling systems in
containing airborne pathogens; they are
partnering with the Johns Hopkins Center
for Bioengineering Innovation and Design
and Jhpiego (an international nonprofit
health organization affiliated with
Hopkins) to test prototypical personal
protective equipment. Data from these
initiatives will not only impact the design of
future biocontainment units in resource-
rich health care facilities but also help
international response teams managing
outbreaks in the field.
Before the 2014 to 2016 Ebola outbreak,
there were four designated biocontainment
facilities in the United States, with a
combined total capacity of 9 to 11 beds that
could be used to treat patients infected with
a high-consequence pathogen. Now, as a
consequence of the efforts of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, there are
approximately 121 isolation beds in the
United States. There is an opportunity now,
before the next infectious disease crisis, to
use existing biocontainment units to drive
the science on infection control for high-
consequence pathogens forward.
Although this and similar units are
technological (albeit pricey) marvels, it
should not be acceptable that such
innovations only be available in resource-
rich countries. An effective global solution
to fast-spreading contagious diseases must
include the development of appropriate
health care resources in places where such
outbreaks are most likely to emerge—places
where the health care infrastructure may
be threadbare and easily overwhelmed.
In such regions, what is required more
than high-tech biocontainment units
is an investment in quality medical
education, improved access to needed
medications, and supply and support of
basic laboratory services. Lower-cost
solutions applied where global outbreaks
start may be even more effective than
high-cost solutions meant to keep them
from hurting us. n
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